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A secure quantum identification system combining a classical identification procedure and quantum key distribu-
tion is proposed. Each identification sequence is always used just once and new sequences are “refuelled” from
a shared provably secret key transferred through the quantum channel. Two identification protocols are devised.
The first protocol can be applied when legitimate users have an unjammable public channel at their disposal. The
deception probability is derived for the case of a noisy quantum channel. The second protocol employs uncondi-
tionally secure authentication of information sent over the public channel, and thus it can be applied even in the
case when an adversary is allowed to modify public communications. An experimental realization of a quantum
identification system is described.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic communications have become one of the
main pillars of the modern society. Their utilization
places new demands on the establishment of security of
transmitted data. In everyday life there are many situa-
tions when it is necessary to conceal the contents of in-
formation conveyed over insecure communications lines,
such as when databases containing confidential data on
citizens are to be distributed among authorities, when fi-
nancial transactions are performed between banks (or for
electronic shopping over the Internet), or when we want
to withdraw money from automated teller machines, and,
of course, for military and diplomatic purposes.
In all these instances, cryptography proves very help-
ful. One of the basic cryptographic tasks is to certify the
identities of the legitimate users of a communications line
(traditionally called Alice and Bob) so that no third party
monitoring their identification can impersonate either of
them. Moreover, the system must be designed in such
a way that after a successful mutual identification even
Bob cannot later on pretend to someone else to be Alice
and vice versa.
Existing identification systems are merely computa-
tionally secure, i.e., they rely on limited advancement
of computer power, technologies, and mathematical al-
gorithms in the foreseeable future. The construction of a
quantum computer can seriously menace the security of
classical identification systems. A quantum identification
system was first proposed by C. Cre´peau and L. Salvail
in [1]. Their identification protocol is based on quantum
oblivious transfer [2,3]. Alice and Bob mutually check
their knowledge of a common secret string without dis-
closing it. However, quantum oblivious transfer has been
proved insecure against the so-called collective attacks
by D. Mayers [4,5], and H.-K. Lo and H.F. Chau [6]. Al-
though to perform collective attacks is not possible with
current technology, recent developments suggest that it
might be possible in the near future.
In the protocols proposed here, Alice and Bob check
their common secret string in a classical way. To pre-
vent from a later misuse, each identification sequence is
used only once and the distribution of a new common
secret string is achieved by means of quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD). QKD, based on the BB84 protocol [7],
has recently been proved secure against any collective
attack allowed by quantum mechanics [8,9], and thus it
offers unconditional protection even against eavesdrop-
pers possessing unlimited computational and technolog-
ical power. QKD is capable to provide two users with
a random shared secret string, whose secrecy is guar-
anteed by the fundamental laws of quantum mechan-
ics. Many papers have already been devoted to quan-
tum cryptography. Let us mention only a few of them
[7,10,11,12,13,14,15] and the survey [16]. A large bibli-
ography may also be found in [17].
In this paper, two protocols for quantum mutual iden-
tification are presented. The first is designed for the case
of an unjammable public channel. Since this requirement
might appear too strong in practice, we also present a
second protocol that utilizes unconditionally secure au-
thentication of messages sent over the public channel.
Both protocols have been implemented in a laboratory
setup over a distance of 0.5 km.
II. IDENTIFICATION WITH UNJAMMABLE
OPEN CHANNEL
On the assumption that the open channel used for com-
munication during the quantum key distribution cannot
be modified, a simple identification protocol can be im-
plemented. The proposed identification protocol does not
rely on quantum bit commitment or oblivious transfer,
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but it is based on a simple classical identification method
using each time a new identification sequence (i.e., the
sequence is changed after each identification act, either
successful or unsuccessful). This method is secure in the
following sense: a sufficient length of an identification
sequence (IS) exists such that the probability of a suc-
cess of an unauthorized user is smaller than an arbitrary
small positive number. Since each IS may be used only
once, the users need to regularly refuel their pools of se-
quences. Here we are coming to the “quantum part” of
the protocol. The well known quantum key distribution
procedure (QKD) [7] is well suitable to accomplish this
task. Of course, a certain amount of secret information
must be shared at the beginning. But later, the used
ISs are replaced by new ones transmitted by means of
QKD. A limited number of ISs could be stored, e.g., on
a chip card and encrypted using a “personal identifica-
tion number” (PIN). Owing to discarding each used IS,
the probability of a success of an unauthorized user of
the “lost” card depends on the number of stored ISs and
on the length of the PIN (varying these parameters, this
probability could be made arbitrarily small).
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FIG. 1. Information as a function of error rate: IAB – in-
formation shared by Alice and Bob, Iopt – Eve’s information
gained using optimum eavesdropping strategy according to
[21], Ilimit – below this limit of Eve’s information on the key,
the deception probability in Protocol I can be made arbitrar-
ily small by prolonging ISs. The intersection of Ilimit and Iopt
shows the estimate of the upper bound of the error rate for
the identification application following Protocol I.
Let us note that there is no need to perform error cor-
rection and privacy amplification [10] after QKD. The
correspondence between two compared ISs need not then
be perfect, the errors being caused either by the imperfec-
tions of the device or by eavesdropping. If the legitimate
parties tolerate a certain small number of errors, then it
is also necessary to suppose that an eavesdropper (Eve)
could capture some information on new “refuelled” ISs by
measurements on the quantum channel. The authorized
users are able to estimate the amount of this informa-
tion [21]. Nevertheless, if the ISs are long enough, this
tap information is not sufficient for Eve to succeed in the
identification procedure, at least if she can perform only
separate and independent measurements on transmitted
qubits (for the so-called coherent attack the situation is
more complex). Strictly speaking, for error rates below a
certain level, the deception probability can be made arbi-
trarily small by prolonging ISs. For details see Appendix
A.
As an example, assume an error rate ε = 0.01 (it can
be seen in Fig. 1 that this error rate lies below the upper
bound value εub (Eq. A4)). For this error rate, the av-
erage probability that Eve correctly guesses a bit, if she
applies an optimum strategy, is approximately p¯
.
= 0.6
(this is computed from Iopt – see Fig. 1 – using Eq. (65)
in [21] and the definition of information). Then it fol-
lows from Eq. A2 that for ISs of length N ≥ 50 bits, the
deception probability P (N, ε) < 10−10.
The protocol consists of a three-pass exchange of ISs
and it can be realized as follows. Note that Alice and
Bob must initially share several triads of ISs.
Protocol I (unjammable open channel)
• Alice and Bob say each other their ordinal numbers
of IS triads in the stack – a pointer to the first
Alice’s (Bob’s) unused sequence – and choose the
higher one if they differ.
• – Alice sends the first IS of the triad to Bob.
– Bob checks whether it agrees with his copy. If
not, Bob aborts communication and shifts his
pointer to the next triad. Otherwise, he sends
the second IS of the triad to Alice.
– Alice compares whether her and Bob’s second
ISs agree. If not, she aborts communication
and shifts her pointer. Otherwise, she sends
the third IS to Bob. If Bob finds it correct,
the identification is successfully finished.
• To replace the used ISs, Alice and Bob “refuel” new
ISs by means of QKD and set the pointers to their
initial positions.
Three passes are necessary for the following reason: An
eavesdropper (Eve) can pretend to be Bob and get the
first IS from Alice. Of course, Alice recognizes that Eve
is not Bob because Eve cannot send the correct second
IS. So Alice aborts connection and discards this triad
(i.e., shifts the pointer to the next one). However, later
on Eve could turn to Bob and impersonate Alice. She
knows the first IS! Bob can recognize a dishonest Eve
just only because she does not know the third IS.
Another possibility would be to have only one IS and
to send alternately one bit from Alice to Bob and one
from Bob to Alice. The communication is aborted when
an admissible number of errors is exceeded. However, the
derivation of deception probability is more complicated
in this case.
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III. IDENTIFICATION WITH AUTHENTICATED
PUBLIC DISCUSSION
In practice, the “auxiliary” information transmitted
through the open channel during QKD could be modi-
fied, as it is difficult to create a physically unjammable
classical channel. Therefore authentication of the mes-
sages sent over the open channel is necessary. This proce-
dure requires additional “key” material to be stored and
transmitted in a similar way as ISs (again, each “key”
may be used just once). This authentication, however,
can be utilized for the identification itself. A three-pass
authenticated public discussion, performed during QKD,
can function as the three-pass exchange of ISs described
in the preceeding section.
However, there are several problems. First, it would
be more difficult to estimate Eve’s chances to succeed
in the identification, if a certain number of errors were
allowed in the quantum distributed key, because the au-
thentication tag depends not only on the “key” (or IS)
but also on the message itself. So, it is necessary (or,
at least, simpler) to execute error correction and privacy
amplification.
The second problem is more subtle. For quantum cryp-
tography to provide unconditional security, the procedure
used for authentication of public discussion must also be
unconditionally secure, not only computationally. Such
authentication algorithms exist [18]. These algorithms
are based on the so-called orthogonal arrays [19]. It can
be shown, however, that the length (in bits, e.g.) of an
“authentication key” must always be greater than the
length of the authenticated message. If m is the number
of all possible messages, κ the number of keys, and n
the number of all possible authentication tags, it can be
proved using methods of orthogonal arrays theory that
κ ≥ m(n− 1) + 1.
Now it is straightforward to show that
κ > m, if n ≥ 2.
An example of an authentication protocol is given in Ap-
pendix B.
This fact represents a difficulty for QKD. The length
in bits of the messages communicated over the public
channel is always greater than the length of transmitted
“quantum” key. For each qubit at least one bit of infor-
mation about the basis chosen by Alice and one bit about
the basis chosen by Bob must be interchanged. Only
about one half of all successfully received qubits can be
used as a key (requirement of coincidence of bases). Be-
sides, part of the key has to be sacrificed and compared
by Alice and Bob in order to detect potential eavesdrop-
ping, which is also done through the open channel. So
there is not enough “quantum” key material to replace
the used bits for the next authentication even in the case
one does not intend to use the transmitted “quantum”
key (or its part) for other purposes.
The way out of this impasse is to realize that it is not
necessary to authenticate all parts of the public discus-
sion done during QKD.
The most important and characteristic property of
quantum cryptography is that any attempt at eavesdrop-
ping inevitably increases the number of errors in the
transmitted key. Thus it is necessary to prevent Eve
from modifying in any way the part of public discus-
sion connected with the error-rate estimation. Therefore,
messages containing the sacrificed part of the “quantum”
key (including corresponding bases and positions of sac-
rificed bits) have to be authenticated. Any modification
of the rest of public communication could impair QKD,
but would not jeopardize the security of the system. This
check on error rate should be performed as the first step
of the public discussion, even before the establishment
of the sifted key by comparison of bases! Otherwise a
malicious Eve could manipulate the non-authenticated
public transmission for her benefit. She could, e.g., ex-
change separate sifted keys with Alice and Bob and then
choose only those bits where the choice of bases coin-
cides for all three of them, thus obtaining full knowledge
of the key without increasing the error rate (at the cost
of decreasing the transmission rate).
An important question is the length of the sacrificed
subset that serves the error-rate estimation. Alice and
Bob agree on a maximum tolerable error rate εmax, whose
value must be lower than the theoretical limit for a safe
noisy quantum channel. Several such limits have been
derived in the literature for different kinds of Eve’s at-
tacks [21,22], nevertheless the ultimate value for the most
general attack is not known at present. In Appendix C
we give a derivation of the length of the subset and the
limiting error-rate estimate εlim Alice and Bob can ac-
cept so that the probability that the actual error rate
is higher than εmax, is lower than a prescribed “safety
parameter” δ.
Provided that Alice and Bob initially share a pool of
secret information, the identification procedure consists
of the following steps:
Protocol II (authenticated open channel)
• Alice and Bob first perform transmission over the
quantum channel according to the BB84 protocol,
i.e., Alice randomly alternates two bases and two
bit values, while Bob records detections in ran-
domly chosen bases (raw quantum transmission).
• Alice and Bob say each other their addresses in the
pool of shared secret information – a pointer to the
first Alice’s (Bob’s) unused bit – and choose the
higher one if they differ. Then follows a three-pass
authenticated public discussion that serves the esti-
mation of the error rate and mutual identification:
– Bob sends to Alice an authenticated message
containing the positions of bits randomly se-
lected for error-rate estimation.
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– Alice checks authentication and aborts com-
munication if it fails. Otherwise she sends
back to Bob an authenticated message con-
taining the bases and bit values of the selected
qubits.
– Bob checks authentication and aborts commu-
nication if it fails. Next he compares bases
of the selected subset and retains only those
qubits where his and Alice’s bases coincide. At
last, he estimates error rate. He sends to Alice
an authenticated message to inform her that
identification was successful and to convey the
value of the error-rate estimate. Alice checks
authentication and aborts communication if it
fails.
• If the error-rate estimate is lower than a maximum
tolerable error rate εlim, Alice and Bob compare
bases of the rest of their raw data and arrive at their
sifted keys. Otherwise they suspect Eve of listen-
ing in and cannot safely use the just accomplished
quantum transmission to establish new shared se-
cret sequences.
• Then they perform error correction and privacy
amplification procedures and arrive at an error-free
distilled key. The level of privacy amplification is
based on εmax.
• Alice and Bob refuel their shared secret informa-
tion.
The used authentication sequences are always thrown
away. The length of the raw quantum transmission must
be selected such that the length of the newly obtained
distilled key is greater than the number of bits consumed
for authentication/identification purposes. It is conve-
nient if it covers several unsuccessful identification acts.
We give concrete figures in Section V.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE APPARATUS
The experimental implementation of our system is
based on an interferometric setup (i.e., on phase cod-
ing) with time multiplexing. It consists of two unbal-
anced fibre Mach-Zehnder interferometers (see Fig. 2).
The path difference (2 m) of the arms of each interfer-
ometer is larger than the width of the laser pulse (its
duration is 4 ns). Interference occurs at the outputs of
the second interferometer for pulses “taking” long-short
or short-long paths. These paths are of the same length
and are indistinguishable. Each of these interferometers
represents the main part of the “terminals” of both com-
municating parties. The terminals are interconnected by
a 0.5 km single mode optical fibre acting as a quantum
channel , and by a classical channel (local computer net-
work). As a light source, a semiconductor pulsed laser
with a repetition rate of 100 kHz operating at 830 nm
is used. Laser pulses are attenuated by a computer-
controlled attenuator so that the intensity level at the
output of the first interferometer is below 1 photon per
pulse on the average. The accuracy of this setting is mon-
itored by detector D3. Polarization properties of light in
the interferometers are controlled by polarization con-
trollers PoC. To balance the lengths of the arms, an air
gap AG with a remotely controlled gap-width is used.
The phase coding is performed by means of two planar
electro-optic phase modulators PM (one at each termi-
nal). To achieve high interference visibility, the splitting
ratio of the last combiner must approach 50:50 as closely
as possible (see [20]). Therefore a variable ratio coupler
VRC is employed there. With this setup, it is possible
to reach visibilities well above 99.5%. The total losses of
the second interferometer do not exceed 4.5 dB.
FIG. 2. A scheme of the optical part of the built quantum
identification system. El. Att. – electronic attenuator, PoC
– polarization controllers, PM – planar electro-optic phase
modulators, ATT – attenuators, Pol – polarizers, C – fibre
couplers, VRC – variable ratio coupler, AG – air gap.
Detectors D1–D3 are single photon counting modules
with Si-avalanche photodiodes. Their output signals
are processed by detection electronics based on time-to-
amplitude converters and single channel analyzers. Both
terminals are fully driven by computers. The interferom-
eters are placed in polystyrene thermo-isolating boxes.
Together with automatic active stabilization of interfer-
ence, it enables us to reach low error rates (0.3–0.4 %)
with data transmission rates of the order of several kbits
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per second.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
(PROTOCOL II)
To estimate the error rate of the just completed quan-
tum transmission, Alice and Bob sacrifice a subset of
their raw data and publicly compare bit values. It is im-
portant that this is the first step of processing the raw
data obtained from the transmission over the quantum
channel. The selection of bit positions for the subset
must be completely random so that Eve has no a priori
information about which bits may appear in the subset.
Let us first focus on the authenticated part of public
discussion. We choose the length of the subset 2s = 2000
bits. If the “safety parameter” δ = 10−10 is required, we
must reject all raw quantum transmissions for which we
obtain error-rate estimate εest ≥ 2.4% (see Appendix C
for details). If the total of N laser pulses have been used
for the raw quantum transmission, we need
• 2s[log2N ] + a bits to convey and authenticate po-
sitions of selected bits,
• 4s + a bits to convey authenticated bases and bit
values of the selected bits, and,
• say, 32+a bits to convey the final message whether
everything is OK or not.
Here [x] denotes the smallest integer larger than x, and
a ≥ [log2(1/δ)] is the length of the authentication tag
(see Appendix B). We use a = 61. In total this gives the
requirement to share at least
bmin = 2s([log2N ] + 2) + 32 + 3a (1)
secret bits initially.
The length of the sifted key we obtain depends on the
intensity of laser pulses µ at the output of Alice’s inter-
ferometer, on the transmissivity of the communications
line ηTL (0.63 in our device), transmissivity of Bob’s in-
terferometer ηBOB (0.35), and the quantum efficiency of
detectors ηDET (0.55). This yields overall transmissivity
η = ηTLηBOBηDET = 0.12 and we obtain a sifted key of
the average length
NS =
1
2
ηµN. (2)
The error correction and privacy amplification proce-
dures we use are basically those used by Bennett et al.
[10].∗. We have empirically found that after error correc-
∗The improved techniques of [23,24], enabling a more rigor-
ous determination of the fraction of key bits to be discarded
[25], can also be used, and very recent results of [26] show how
to incorporate more sophisticated quantum non-demolition
measurement instead of a beamsplitting attack.
tion we are left with approximately
NC = (1− 2.7ε
2/3)NS
bits, ε being the actual error rate. At last, privacy am-
plification leaves us with
ND = NC −
ηµ2
8ηTL
N −
2εmaxNS
ln 2
− 5
√
N
ηµ2
8ηTL
(
1−
ηµ2
8ηTL
)
+
2(ln 2 + 1)NSεmax
ln2 2
+
ln(δ ln 2)
ln 2
(3)
bits of distilled key†. The second term on the r.h.s. of
Eq. (3) expresses the number of bits Eve could obtain by
beamsplitting [10] with the capability of replacement of
the lossy communications line by a line of ηTL = 1, while
Alice and Bob tolerate a drop in the data rate to one half
of the expected value‡. The third term contains the num-
ber of bits Eve could obtain by a probe interaction attack
with the possibility of delayed (after the announcement of
the bases but before error correction and privacy ampli-
fication) measurements on individual photons [21]§. The
fourth term is a 5-standard-deviations safeguard, whose
derivation is analogous to that in [10]). The last term is
a privacy amplification compression that decreases Eve’s
information to δ bits. Collective attacks are not included,
as no bound on the information an eavesdropper can get
through a collective attack has been derived yet; it has
just been proved that such a bound exists [8,9]. Prelimi-
nary results on coherent eavesdropping also suggest that
it does not seem to substantially increase Eve’s informa-
tion [27].
We have optimized this relation to maximize the ra-
tio ND/N . For our system (η = 0.12, ε = 0.004) with
the choice εmax = 0.07 and 2s = 2000), we have found
an optimum average intensity µ ≈ 0.8 photon per pulse
(Fig. 3). This value represents a trade-off between the
number of pulses successfully detected by Bob and the
reduction of the length of the key caused by privacy am-
plification, and sensitively depends on the overall losses
of the system. The ratio ND/N depends only weakly on
δ so that it is easy to achieve an arbitrary security level.
It is worth noting that for sufficiently low µ, the ratio
bmin/ND converges to zero with increasing N so that it
is always possible to generate more new shared secret
†Eq. (3) is valid for µ ≪ 1, a general relation is somewhat
clumsy and we do not give it here.
‡The intensity at Bob’s side also fluctuates for several physi-
cal reasons, therefore it is not reasonable to limit the intensity
drop caused by eavesdropping in a too restrictive way.
§In fact, this number represents the information Eve could
obtain, which may not necessarily be in the form of a set of
deterministic bits.
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bits than it is consumed for authentication. Therefore
authenticated QKD may be regarded as an “expander”
of shared secret information, once the ratio r = ND/bmin
is greater than 1. For our system, we get r = 1 for
N = 3.1× 106 laser pulses (see Fig. 3).
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FIG. 3. The dependence of the number of laser pulses N
needed to generate as much distilled key (Eq. 3) as it is con-
sumed for authentication during identification (Eq. 1) on the
intensity µ of laser pulses at the output of Alice’s interfer-
ometer for three different values of the transmissivity of the
communications line ηTL. The higher the losses of the trans-
mission line (or its length), the lower must be the intensity
at the output of Alice’s interferometer and the greater is the
number of laser pulses needed to generate enough distilled key.
We can see that the optimum intensity is about 0.8 photon
per pulse in our case (ηTL = 0.63).
The whole identification procedure starts with raw
quantum transmission. In our experimental setup, we
generate raw key data at sequences of 320, 000 laser
pulses. After each sequence, active stabilization of the
interferometers is performed to ensure low error rate de-
spite environmental perturbations. This yields an aver-
age raw key data rate of cca 5.7 kbits per second. Once
about 600,000 photons are successfully detected by Bob
(we want r ≥ 2), a three-pass authenticated public dis-
cussion is performed according to Protocol II described
above. If all three authentications are found correct, Al-
ice and Bob have mutually identified themselves. If, in
addition, the computed error-rate estimate falls below
the value εlim, they are able to refuel new secret key ma-
terial.
They start doing this by comparing the bases of the
rest of the raw key data, thus arriving at approximately
300 kbits of sifted key. As final steps, they perform er-
ror correction and privacy amplification procedures. The
level of privacy amplification is based on εmax and the
“security parameter” δ, as follows from Eq. (3). For our
usual error rates of 0.3–0.4%, Alice and Bob obtain about
117 kbits of distilled key generated at an average rate of
650 bits per second. This well covers approximately 50
kbits of previously shared secret key material consumed
during the authenticated discussion. Let us note that we
did not perform any special optimization of data rate, the
bottlenecks being here the way we drive the equipment
from PCs and the bandwidth of the detection electronics
we used. Nevertheless, in our setup the whole identifi-
cation procedure takes less than 3 minutes (including all
auxiliary processes).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the possibility to utilize the advan-
tages of quantum cryptography for mutual identification.
Quantum key distribution can serve as a source to “con-
tinuously” supply shared secret key material for classical
identification methods, which employ one key just for one
identification act. For the case of an unjammable open
channel and a noisy quantum channel, a simple identifi-
cation protocol has been proposed and deception prob-
ability has been derived. For a more realistic situation
of a jammable open channel, an identification protocol
employing authentication of public discussion has been
devised. A laboratory prototype of the identification
system has been built. It is based on a “one-photon”
interferometric method and on the quantum transmis-
sion protocol BB84. The main physical parameters are
following: distance 0.5 km, wavelength 830 nm, raw data
rate about 5 kbits per sec., distilled key generation rate
650 bits per sec., error rate in the range 0.3–0.4 %.
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APPENDIX A: DECEPTION PROBABILITY
Let us denote ε the error rate of the device. Let the
length of IS be N and let us tolerate maximally k = [εN ]
errors in the identification procedure ([x] denotes the
smallest integer greater than x). If Eve’s measurements
are independent and if the probability that Eve correctly
guesses the i-th bit in the sequence is pi, then the prob-
ability that Eve succeeds in the identification is
P (N, ε) =
k∑
ℓ=0
∑
{i1...iℓ}

 N∏
j=1
pj


(
ℓ∏
m=1
qim
pim
)
. (A1)
Here qi = (1 − pi) and the second sum goes over all ℓ-
tuples of numbers from 1 to N (for ℓ = 0 there is only
6
∏
j pj). Employing Jensen’s inequality [28], one can find
that
N∏
j=1
pj ≤ (p¯)
N ,
with
p¯ =
1
N
N∑
j=1
pj .
Further, realizing that for p ≥ 1/2 the expression q/p ≤ 1
is valid and that for ℓ ≤ k the inequality
(
N
ℓ
)
≤
(
k
ℓ
)(
N
k
)
holds, one finally obtains the deception probability:
P (N, ε) ≤ (p¯)N2k
(
N
k
)
. (A2)
The question is for which p¯ and ε the limN→∞ P (N, ε) =
0 [i.e., when P can be made arbitrarily small by increas-
ing N ]. It can be shown that if 0 < limN→∞ β(N) < 1
then limN→∞[β(N)]
N = 0 and if limN→∞ β(N) > 1 then
limN→∞[β(N)]
N = ∞ (β(N) is an arbitrary function of
N). Thus for each ε, a probability pcrit
pcrit = lim
n→∞
2−k/n
(
n
k
)−1/n
, (A3)
may be defined such that for all p¯ < pcrit, the limit
limN→∞ P (N, ε) = 0. The graph in Fig. 1 shows av-
erage information per bit Ilimit = 1 + pcrit log2(pcrit) +
(1 − pcrit) log2(1 − pcrit) corresponding to pcrit together
with mutual information of Alice and Bob IAB and Eve’s
information gained by optimal eavesdropping strategy
Iopt = IAE = IEB (see [21] Eq. (65)) as a function of
error rate ε. The intersection of Ilimit and Iopt deter-
mines the estimation of the upper bound of the error
rate for this identification application:
εub ≈ 0.066. (A4)
A disputative question might be the case of collective
(or coherent) attacks when the probabilities of the cor-
rect guesses of particular bits need not be independent
anymore and then the probability P (N, ε) may decrease
with increasing N more slowly in comparison with the
previous case.
APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE OF
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
If probabilities of impersonification are to be the same
for all possible pairs (message, authentication tag), then
there exists an orthogonal array that serves as a base
for an authentication code. In such a case the deception
probability, defined as a maximum from the above men-
tioned probabilities of impersonification, is minimal and
is equal to the reciprocal of the number of all possible
authentication tags.
There is a class of orthogonal arrays that enables us
to construct reasonable authentication codes [18]. If p is
prime and d ≥ 2 is an integer, an authentication code can
be created for (pd−1)/(p−1) messages with pd keys and
p authentication tags (the deception probability is p−1).
For a given message and a given authentication key, the
authentication tag can be calculated as follows:
1. Convert a given authentication key to the number
system of the base p (its maximal length in this
system is d). Let us denote the i-th “digit” by ri.
2. Construct and order all non-zero “numbers” in the
number system of the base p of the maximum
length d that have the first non-zero “digit” from
the left equal to 1 [there are (pd − 1)/(p− 1) such
numbers]. A one-to-one mapping exists between all
possible messages and all “numbers” (or sequences)
from this set. Assign the corresponding “number”
(the ordering of the “numbers” is assumed to be
fixed) to the message to be authenticated. Let the
i-th “digit” of that particular “number” be denoted
by ci.
3. The authentication tag is given by the equation
A(r, c) =
d∑
i=1
rici mod p.
As a practical example (used in implementation of
Protocol II), we have chosen p = 261 − 1 (it’s prime)
and d = 739. Then the deception probability is about
5 · 10−19. The length of the key is 45079 bits, the length
of the message can be up to 45017 bits and the authen-
tication tag consist of 61 bits.
By the way, in case of p of this form it is not neces-
sary to make the conversion of item (1) above. One can
just create groups consisting of 61 random bits. What is
only necessary is to discard groups containing all 61 ones
(the probability of appearance of such a group is deuced
small).
APPENDIX C: DERIVATION OF THE LENGTH
OF SUBSET FOR ERROR-RATE ESTIMATION
Let us suppose that we select a subset of length 2s.
After comparison of bases, s bits will be retained on the
average. Provided that the actual error rate is ε, the
probability that we find k errors in the subset of length
s (i.e., the error-rate estimate is εest = k/s) is given by
p(εest|ε) =
(
s
k
)
εk(1− ε)s−k. (C1)
Applying Bayes’ theorem, the probability that the actual
error rate is ε, when the estimate is εest = k/s, is given
by
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p(ε|εest) =
{
εεest(1 − ε)1−εest
}s∫ 1
0
{εεest(1− ε)1−εest}
s
dε
. (C2)
Here we assume a uniform distribution of ε. We are now
interested in finding a limiting value εlim such that for
all εest ≤ εlim the probability
P (ε > εmax) =
∫ 1
εmax
p(ε|εest)dε ≤ δ, (C3)
where a small positive number δ denotes the “security
parameter”. In Fig. 4 we plot the solution of the equation
∫ 1
εmax
{
εεlim(1− ε)1−εlim
}s
dε∫ 1
0
{εεlim(1− ε)1−εlim}
s
dε
= δ (C4)
with respect to εlim for several values of δ. A maxi-
mum acceptable error rate εmax = 0.07 has been cho-
sen, which is well below the lowest security limit derived
so far (0.146) [21]. The graph in Fig. 4 should be un-
derstood as follows: Once we select a suitable value for
the subset length, s, and the “security parameter” δ, the
corresponding curve suggests a limiting value for the esti-
mated error level, above which the transmitted sequence
should be rejected as it cannot be guaranteed to have the
actual error rate ε ≤ εmax with the required probability
1− δ.
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FIG. 4. The dependence of limiting value εlim on a sub-
set size s for different values of the “security parameter” δ,
when a maximum error rate of εmax = 0.07 is tolerated (see
Eq. C4). A subset of the length 2s is randomly selected from
raw quantum data which yields s bits with coincident bases
on the average. Quantum transmission is considered insecure
(i.e., the probability of the actual error rate ε being higher
than εmax is not lower than δ), if the error-rate estimate εest
obtained from the subset check exceeds the value εlim. In
our case we choose s = 1000 and δ = 10−10, and we find
εlim ≈ 2.4%.
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